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Washington Limited License Legal Technicians (LLLTs) are  
non-lawyers who will supposedly help to close “the wide and  
ever-growing gap in necessary legal and law related services for low and 
moderate income persons.”1 However, LLLTs will not close the access to 
justice gap because “[t]here are no protections . . . to ensure that legal 
technicians will actually provide services to the poor, as opposed to  
selling their services to those who can most afford them,”2 and LLLTs 
are “not going to have the competency to actually do for the poor what 
needs to be done.”3 Additionally, the modifications of the Washington 
Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs) accompanying the adoption of the 
LLLT rule create significant ethical issues by allowing non-lawyer  
ownership of law firms and fee sharing among lawyers and LLLTs.4 
Currently, LLLTs only exist in Washington State, and the “legal 
technician” is a relatively new concept in the United States.5 In 2008, the 
Washington Practice of Law Board (POLB)6 recommended the LLLT 
rule, and the Washington State Supreme Court adopted the rule in 2012.7 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., 1999, University of Washington. I 
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 1. In re Adoption of New APR 28, No. 25700-A-1005 (Wash. Sup. Ct. June 14, 2012), 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3MCA-44WW] [hereinafter LLLT Court Order]. 
 2. Letter from Deborah M. Nelson, President, Wash. State Trial Lawyers Ass’n, to the WSBA, 
Bd. of Governors (Dec. 7, 2006), http://www.courts.wa.gov/ 
court_Rules/proposed/2009Jan/APR28/Erik%20Bjornson.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2ER-JWN9]. 
 3. Robert Ambrogi, Opinion, Who Says You Need a Law Degree to Practice Law?, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/closing-the-justice-gap/ 
2015/03/13/a5f576c8-c754-11e4-aa1a-86135599fb0f_story.html [https://perma.cc/9756-7T6F] 
(quoting Ruth Laura Edlund, former chair of the WSBA Family Law Section). 
 4. See infra, Part II.A. 
 5. See generally John Levin, Non-lawyer Legal Practitioners–A Coming Trend, CHI. BAR 
ASS’N RECORD 48 (Apr./May 2015). 
 6. See generally WASH. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 24. 
 7. See LLLT Court Order, supra note 1. 
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In the court order creating Admission to Practice Rule 28 (APR 28), the 
Washington State Supreme Court said that, according to the Washington 
State Civil Legal Needs Study,8 “[e]very day, across this state, thousands 
of unrepresented (pro se) individuals seek to resolve important legal  
matters in our courts.”9 The court also said that many of these individuals 
are low-income or moderate-income people who “cannot obtain help 
from an overtaxed, underfunded civil legal aid system,” and cannot  
afford legal services.10 The court admitted that APR 28 would not “solve 
the access to justice crisis,” but concluded that the rule was “a good 
start.”11 
According to APR 28, an LLLT is “a person qualified by education, 
training and work experience who is authorized to engage in the limited 
practice of law in approved practice areas of law.”12 An LLLT is not 
permitted to represent clients in court but may provide “limited legal  
assistance” to clients representing themselves.13 Under APR 28, LLLTs 
have a limited scope of practice that requires them to tell clients to seek 
representation by lawyers if a legal issue is beyond the “defined practice 
area” for LLLTs.14 Currently, the defined practice area for LLLTs is 
called “domestic relations,” which includes family law issues such as 
child support modifications, dissolution, domestic violence, legal  
separation, and parenting plan modifications.15 
In the domestic relations practice area, unless prohibited by other 
parts of APR 28, “LLLTs may advise and assist clients (1) to initiate and 
respond to actions and (2) regarding motions, discovery, trial  
preparation, temporary and final orders, and modifications of orders.”16 
After determining whether an issue is within their scope of practice,17 
LLLTs may do the following: engage in fact finding; inform clients of 
applicable procedures and required documents; provide clients with  
approved self-help materials; review information received from the  
opposing party;18 “[s]elect, complete, file, and effect service of [certain] 
                                                     
 8. See generally WASH. SUP. CT. TASK FORCE ON CIVIL EQUAL JUSTICE FUNDING, 
WASHINGTON STATE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (Sept. 2003). 
 9. LLLT Court Order, supra note 1, at 4. 
 10. Id. at 4. 
 11. Id. at 11. 
 12. WASH. SUP CT. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(B)(4); see also Legal Technician FAQ, WASH. 
ST. B. ASS’N, http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-and-Lawyer-Conduct/Limited-Licenses/Legal-
Technicians/Legal-Technician-FAQs [https://perma.cc/4V8T-6BS6]. See generally KARL B. 
TEGLAND, 2 WASH. PRAC., RULES PRAC. APR 28 (7th ed. 2015). 
 13. See WASH. SUP. CT. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(B)(4). 
 14. See id. R. 28(F). 
 15. See id. R. 28, app. 2(B)(1). 
 16. Id. R. 28, app. 2(B)(2). 
 17. See id. R. 28(F). 
 18. See id. R. 28(F)(1)–(5). 
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forms”;19 do legal research; “[d]raft legal letters and documents . . . if the 
work is reviewed and approved by a Washington lawyer”;20 and help 
clients obtain “necessary documents or records, such as birth, death, or 
marriage certificates.”21 
In order to become an LLLT, a person must be at least eighteen 
years old, be of good moral character and fitness, have at least an  
associate level degree, have forty-five credit hours of training at an 
American Bar Association (ABA) approved law school, pass an  
examination, and accumulate 3,000 hours of supervised work experience 
within three years.22 APR 28 also requires an annual license fee and 
“proof of ability to respond in damages resulting from . . . acts or  
omissions in the performance of [permitted] services.”23 
The University of Washington School of Law offers the only LLLT 
program in Washington State.24 The cost for the program is $250 per 
credit hour, which equals $11,250 for the required forty-five credit 
hours.25 The first group of LLLTs graduated from the required training 
program in the fall of 2014, and seven members of the first group passed 
the first LLLT exam in May 2015.26 As of the date of this Comment, the 
Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) website lists the names of 
only sixteen LLLTs.27 
Although many other authors seem to support the creation of  
practitioners like LLLTs,28 this Comment argues that the Washington 
                                                     
 19. WASH. SUP. CT. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(F)(6). 
 20. Id. R. 28(F)(8). There is a proposed rule amendment regarding this specific provision. See 
LTD. LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN BD., REPORT OF THE LIMITED LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN 
BOARD TO THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST THREE YEARS 28 (Feb. 2016), 
http://www.2civility.org/wp-content/uploads/February-2016-Report-of-the-LLLT-Board-to-the-
Washington-Supreme-Court.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JFH-PRPT] [hereinafter LLLT Report]. 
 21. WASH. SUP. CT. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(F)(10). 
 22. See id. R. 28(D)(1)–(3); (E)(1)–(2). 
 23. Id. R. 28(E)(3)–(4). 
 24. See Limited License Legal Technician Program in Family Law, UNIV. WASH. SCH. OF 
LAW, https://www.law.uw.edu/apply/special-programs/lllt/ [https://perma.cc/WNR7-UCJY]. 
 25. See id. The total cost to become an LLLT is actually $14,440. LLLT Report, supra note 20, 
at 26. 
 26. LLLT Report, supra note 20, at 22. 
 27. See Limited License Legal Technicians Program, WASH. ST. B. ASS’N, 
http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-and-Lawyer-Conduct/Limited-Licenses/Legal-Technicians 
[https://perma.cc/BYC7-A7JV]. For the most recent statistics on the population of active LLLTs, see 
LLLT Report, supra note 20, at 24. 
 28. See generally Benjamin P. Cooper, Access to Justice Without Lawyers, 47 AKRON L. REV. 
205 (2014); Stephen R. Crossland & Paula C. Littlewood, The Washington State Limited License 
Legal Technician: Enhancing Access to Justice and Ensuring the Integrity of the Legal Profession, 
65 S.C. L. REV. 611 (2014); Brooks Holland, The Washington State Limited License Legal  
Technician Practice Rule: A National First in Access to Justice, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 75 (2013); 
Leslie C. Levin, The Monopoly Myth and Other Tales About the Superiority of Lawyers, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2611 (2014); Matthew Longobardi, Unauthorized Practice of Law and  
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State Supreme Court erred in adopting APR 28 and amending the  
Washington RPCs because the existence of an access to justice gap is not 
a sufficient justification for allowing non-lawyers to access the legal  
profession. Low-income people need lawyers, not LLLTs, and the  
potential ethical issues that arise by allowing LLLTs to practice law 
demonstrate that APR 28 is improperly designed. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the extensive limitations APR 28 
imposes on LLLTs. Part II discusses the relevant RPC amendments and 
the potential impact of the proposed LLLT Rules of Professional  
Conduct (LLLT RPCs),29 which further limit LLLTs’ scope of practice. 
Part III discusses the arguments against LLLTs. Finally, Part IV  
discusses a viable alternative to the LLLT rule. 
I. THE FIRST “L” IN LLLT: LIMITED 
Despite the Washington State Supreme Court’s contention that 
LLLTs are needed to help close the access to justice gap in Washington, 
the number and type of limitations APR 28 imposes on LLLTs make it 
unlikely that they will serve this purpose. As mentioned above, APR 28 
sets forth a detailed scheme of limitations on LLLTs generally30 and  
further confines LLLTs to practicing only in the area of domestic  
relations.31 
The general limitations on LLLTs include that LLLTs shall not  
represent clients in court or other formal adjudicative or dispute  
resolution proceedings; negotiate clients’ legal rights; communicate  
clients’ positions to others; tell clients another party’s position;32 or 
“[r]epresent or otherwise provide legal or law related services to  
[clients], except as permitted by law, [APR 28] or associated rules and 
regulations.”33 The result of these general limitations is that LLLTs can 
                                                                                                                       
Meaningful Access to the Courts: Is Law Too Important to be Left to Lawyers?, 35 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2043 (2014); Laurel A. Rigertas, Collaborations Between Lawyers and New Legal  
Professionals: A Path to Increase Access to Justice and Protect Clients, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
539 (2015); Jack P. Sahl, Cracks in the Profession’s Monopoly Armor, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2635 
(2014); Richard Zorza & David Udell, New Rules for Non-Lawyers to Increase Access to Justice, 41 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1259 (2014). 
 29. Currently, the full text of LLLT RPCs is only available via a download. See Proposed 
Rules Archives, WASH. COURTS, http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.proposed 
RuleDisplayArchive&ruleId=385 [https://perma.cc/MDP6-2F2D]. “In July 2013, the LLLT Board 
convened the RPC Subcommittee to draft the LLLT RPC.” Id. 
 30. See WASH. SUP. CT. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(H). 
 31. See id. R. 28, app. (2)(B)(3)(a)–(e). There is a proposal to expand LLLTs’ practice areas 
into housing, immigration, and elder law. See LLLT Report, supra note 20, at 31. 
 32. See WASH. SUP. CT. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(H)(4)–(6). 
 33. Id. R. 28(H)(8). There is a proposed rule amendment that would allow LLLTs to prepare 
documents involving issues outside of LLLTs’ scope of practice. See LLLT Report, supra note 20, at 
28. 
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only help clients with family law problems that do not require advocacy 
in a court or formal negotiations with opposing parties.34 If a matter  
progresses to the point where these services are required, then LLLTs 
must refer clients to lawyers. 
The specific limitations in the domestic relations practice area are 
extensive. APR 28 prohibits LLLTs from advising clients about various 
financial matters, including the division of real estate, business entities, 
retirement assets, benefit plans, or contribution plans.35 Also, LLLTs 
cannot advise clients about bankruptcy issues, including the disposition 
of debts when one party is in bankruptcy, unless attorneys instruct the 
LLLTs on how to proceed.36 In domestic violence matters, LLLTs cannot 
advise clients about anti-harassment or anti-stalking orders, no contact 
orders, or sexual assault protection orders.37 As far as child custody  
issues are concerned, LLLTs are prohibited from advising clients about 
major parenting plan modifications unless the parties have previously 
agreed to them. Furthermore, LLLTs cannot assist with objections or 
responses to relocation petitions, temporary orders in relocation actions, 
or, with limited exceptions, final parenting plans in relocation actions.38 
Finally, LLLTs cannot take depositions or initiate or respond to  
appeals.39 
If any of the above issues arise, then LLLTs must refer clients to 
lawyers.40 Therefore, APR 28 greatly restricts the kinds of matters and 
clients LLLTs can accept. After a comprehensive review of APR 28, it is 
not clear what types of matters LLLTs can actually handle; the scope of 
practice for LLLTs is not made any clearer by looking closely at the  
revisions to the RPCs adopted in conjunction with APR 28. 
II. ETHICAL RULES FOR LAWYERS AND LLLTS 
This Part discusses the revisions to the Washington Rules of  
Professional Conduct (RPCs) and the proposed LLLT RPCs. The  
important changes in the RPCs allow business partnerships and  
associations between LLLTs and lawyers, provided that LLLTs do not 
have control over lawyers’ professional judgment.41 Generally, the LLLT 
                                                     
 34. The WSBA is currently in the process of revisiting these limitations. See LLLT Report, 
supra note 20, at 32. 
 35. See WASH. SUP. CT. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28, app. (2)(B)(3)(c)(i). 
 36. See id. R. 28, app. (2)(B)(3)(c)(ii)–(iii). 
 37. See id. R. 28, app. (2)(B)(3)(c)(iv). 
 38. See id. R. 28, app. (2)(B)(3)(c)(v), (viii), (ix). 
 39. See id. R. 28, app. (2)(B)(3)(d)–(e). 
 40. See id. R. 28(F). 
 41. See WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.9(a)(2), (b)(1)–(3). 
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RPCs place additional limits on LLLTs scope of practice that are not 
clearly stated in APR 28. 
A. Revisions to the Rules of Professional Conduct 
In addition to adopting APR 28 in 2012, the Washington State  
Supreme Court amended the RPCs in 2015.42 The most dramatic changes 
to the RPCs include an important modification of RPC 5.4 and the  
addition of two new rules, RPCs 5.9 and 5.10.43 Of the fifty-one United 
States jurisdictions, all but the District of Columbia (D.C.),44 and now  
Washington, follow the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Model Rules) by prohibiting partnerships between lawyers and  
non-lawyers.45 The amended RPC 5.4 departs from this general  
prohibition by allowing LLLTs and lawyers to form partnerships,46 and 
RPC 5.9 has been added to address the issues created by amending  
RPC 5.4. 
1. RPC 5.4: “Professional Independence of a Lawyer” 
In terms of the ethical implications of LLLTs participating in the 
legal process, “the elephant in the room is Rule 5.4.”47 RPC 5.4 provides 
that “[a] lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of 
the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.”48 The 
amendment to the rule comes in the addition of Comment 4, which states 
                                                     
 42. In re Expedited Adoption of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Order No. 25700-A-1096 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.wsba.org/~/media/ 
Files/Legal%20Community/Committees_Boards_Panels/Committee%20on%20Professional%20Ethi
cs/25700-A-1096.ashx [https://perma.cc/5LUC-A2KT] [hereinafter RPC Amendments]. 
 43. See id. at 59, 62–64. This Comment does not discuss the new RPC 5.10. In general, the rule 
provides that “a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over [an] LLLT shall make reasonable 
efforts to ensure that the LLLT’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the 
lawyer and the professional obligations applicable to the LLLT directly.” WASH. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 5.10(b). 
 44. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(b). 
 45. “A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the activities of the  
partnership consist of the practice of law.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(b). However, 
many foreign jurisdictions do not have the same restrictions and allow lawyers and non-lawyers to 
form multidisciplinary partnerships. See generally MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY R. DWYER & 
STEVEN W. BENDER, 2 THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING §§ 16:14–15, 17 (5th ed. 2013). For 
more discussion of the impact of non-lawyer ownership on such partnerships, see Nick Robinson, 
When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits: Non-Lawyer Ownership, Access, and Professionalism, 29 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2016). 
 46. See WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4, cmt. 4. 
 47. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Law School Training for Licensed “Legal Technicians”?  
Implications for the Consumer Market, 65 S.C. L. REV. 579, 590 (2014). 
 48. WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(b). 
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that “[n]otwithstanding Rule 5.4, lawyers and LLLTs may share fees and 
form business structures to the extent permitted by Rule 5.9.”49 
The above amendment makes Washington’s rule similar to D.C.’s 
rule, which is broader than the new RPC 5.4. D.C.’s rule does not limit 
non-lawyer partners to any specific person or type of practitioner (such 
as an LLLT), but refers to non-lawyers who “perform[] professional  
services which assist the organization in providing legal services to  
clients.”50 The D.C. RPCs explain that “the purpose of liberalizing the 
Rules regarding the possession of a financial interest or the exercise of 
management authority by a non-lawyer is to permit non-lawyer  
professionals to work with lawyers in the delivery of legal services  
without being relegated to the role of an employee.”51 However, the D.C. 
RPCs also specify that the rule “does not permit a corporation, an  
investment banking firm, an investor, or any other person or entity to 
entitle itself to all or any portion of the income or profits of a law firm or 
other similar organization.”52 
Although it deviates from the Model Rules, D.C.’s rule has a  
specific justification that does not apply in other jurisdictions. According 
to the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, “Washington, DC, is a 
unique legal environment—and its experience cannot serve as a model 
for other states.”53 This organization has also opined that D.C.’s rule is in 
place to allow local law firms to engage in lobbying as part of their legal  
services and that the benefits of allowing lobbyists to partner with  
lawyers is necessarily restricted to the D.C. legal market.54 Moreover, 
there is a “natural check” against abusing D.C.’s rule “as a means to  
generate capital” because any firm wanting to partner with non-lawyers 
would have to practice only in D.C.; however, “this natural check would 
disappear” if other states adopted similar versions of the rule.55 
Washington D.C. and Washington State are the only jurisdictions 
that have created exceptions to the general rule that lawyers are  
prohibited from forming partnerships with non-lawyers, but there is one 
large firm advocating for modifications of Model Rule 5.4. In a recent 
                                                     
 49. RPC Amendments, supra note 42, at 59. 
 50. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(b). 
 51. Id. r. 5.4, cmt. 7. 
 52. Id. r. 5.4, cmt. 8. For a discussion of D.C. RPC 5.4 in the context of multidisciplinary  
practices, see MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 45, at § 16:16. 
 53. See Letter from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, to Natalia Vera, Senior 
Research Paralegal 5 (June 1, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_comments/uschamberinstituteforlegalreform_issu
espaperconcerningalternativebusinessstructures.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/AS5P-5FAC] 
[hereinafter Letter from SASMF, LLP]. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
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case, Jacoby & Meyers LLC (Jacoby & Meyers) claimed that New York 
RPC 5.456 is unconstitutional.57 The court dismissed the firm’s third 
amended complaint,58 but the claims made illustrate the business reasons 
behind the objections to Model Rule 5.4. Jacoby & Meyers claimed that 
“New York’s prohibition on non-lawyer equity investment in law firms 
jeopardized J & M’s commitment to providing low-cost legal services to 
the poor”59 because it prevented the firm from acquiring more capital 
from non-lawyer investors.60 The firm alleged that the ban on non-lawyer 
ownership in law firms was preventing Jacoby & Meyers from accepting 
offers from “‘several high net-worth individuals’ and institutional  
investors who ‘have expressed their commitment to invest significant 
sums of money’ . . . in exchange for equity in the firm.”61 
Before rejecting all of Jacoby & Meyers’s constitutional claims, the 
court explained the states’ strong interest in regulating lawyer conduct: 
A state’s interest in regulating lawyers, the Supreme Court has said, 
is ‘especially great’ because ‘lawyers are essential to the primary 
governmental function of administering justice, and have  
historically been officers of the courts.’ For that reason, and because 
the judiciary and the public depend upon the ‘professionally ethical 
conduct of attorneys,’ courts themselves have ‘a significant interest 
in assuring and maintaining high standards of conduct of attorneys 
engaged in practice.’62  
Although it failed to state a claim against New York’s RPC 5.4, 
Jacoby & Meyers is not alone in objecting to the prohibition of  
non-lawyer ownership of law firms.63 Advocates of non-lawyer  
ownership of law firms argue that outside investment in law firms  
provides capital for expansion, investments in technology, new associate 
training, financing for contingency fee cases, and reduced reliance on 
bank debt.64 
                                                     
 56. “A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the activities of the 
partnership consist of the practice of law.” N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(b). 
 57. See Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices, 118 F. Supp. 3d 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 58. Id. at 560. 
 59. Id. at 564. 
 60. See id. Contra Letter from SASMF, LLP, supra note 53, at 2–3 (referring to Jacoby & 
Meyers and arguing that “notwithstanding some firms’ complaints about their ability to raise money, 
there is no evidence that U.S. law firms lack sufficient capital to serve their clients”). 
 61. Jacoby & Meyers, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 564. 
 62. Id. at 567 (quoting Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 
423, 432–34 (1982) and Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)). 
 63. See Note, Bernard Sharfman, Modifying Model Rule 5.4 to Allow for Minority Ownership 
of Law Firms by Non-lawyers, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477 (2000). 
 64. See id. at 483–86. 
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In addition to the court in the Jacoby & Meyers case, the ABA has 
opined on the issue of lawyers partnering with non-lawyers.65 ABA  
Formal Ethics Opinion 91-360, issued in 1991, discusses D.C.’s  
modification of Model Rule 5.4, which took place the same year.66 In this 
opinion, the ABA identified two scenarios when a lawyer practicing in a 
jurisdiction with a modified Rule 5.4 might be subject to discipline in a 
jurisdiction governed by the Model Rules: (1) a lawyer is licensed in 
both D.C. and a Model Rules jurisdiction, is a member of a firm that  
includes non-lawyer “partners or principals,” and practices only in D.C.; 
and (2) a lawyer is licensed in both D.C. and a Model Rules jurisdiction, 
is a member of a firm with non-lawyer partners, but the lawyer practices 
only in the Model Rules jurisdiction.67 The ABA concluded that, in the 
first situation, Model Rule 5.4 would not prohibit what D.C.’s rule  
allows and that, in the second situation, Model Rule 5.4 “must prevail.”68 
In other words, a lawyer licensed in both types of jurisdictions practicing 
in a Model Rules jurisdiction “must see to it that no part of the lawyer’s  
practice . . . is conducted through a firm with a non-lawyer partner or 
principle.”69 
More recently, the ABA considered and rejected amending Model 
Rule 5.4 to remove the general prohibition against non-lawyer ownership 
of law firms.70 In 2011, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 decided 
that “two options for alternative business structures—passive equity  
investment in law firms and the public trading of shares in law firms—
would not be appropriate to recommend for implementation in the United 
States at this time.”71 One reason the ABA declined to change Model 
Rule 5.4 is that “[o]pponents to the change argued ‘that non-lawyer  
ownership is unnecessary, [and] threatens the profession’s core  
values.’”72 
Considering the authorities on the issue, and the fact that only two 
jurisdictions have departed from the Model Rules, all the effects of 
Washington’s modification of RPC 5.4 are unknown at this time.  
Presumably, ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 91-360, discussed above, 
means that lawyers licensed in both Washington and a Model Rules  
                                                     
 65. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91–360 (1991). 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See Louise Lark Hill, The Preclusion of Non-lawyer Ownership of Law Firms: Protecting 
the Interest of Clients or Protecting the Interest of Lawyers?, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 907 (2014); ABA 
COMM’N ON ETHICS, ISSUES PAPER CONCERNING ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS STRUCTURES 1–2 (Aug. 
2012) [hereinafter ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS]. 
 71. See ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS, supra note 70, at 2. 
 72. Hill, supra note 70, at 942. 
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jurisdiction, but practicing in Washington, would not be subject to  
discipline for forming a partnership with LLLTs. However, these lawyers 
would likely be subject to discipline if they practiced law in a Model 
Rules jurisdiction through a Washington firm with LLLT partners. 
Given the issues created by departing from Model Rule 5.4, it is 
clear that the LLLT program is not a necessary or sufficient justification 
for Washington’s changes to the rule. LLLTs will likely not be capital  
investors in law firms such as the “high net-worth individuals” referred 
to in the Jacoby & Meyers case, the unique benefit of lobbyist partners 
does not apply in Washington as it does in D.C., and LLLTs could exist 
and practice without the right to partner with lawyers. Therefore, “[t]here 
is no legitimate reason to take that dangerous step.”73 
2. RPC 5.9: “Business Structures Involving LLLT  
and Lawyer Ownership” 
Because the amended RPC 5.4 allows LLLTs to partner with  
lawyers, Washington created RPC 5.9, which limits LLLTs’ involvement 
in these partnerships to protect lawyers’ professional judgment.74  
Accordingly, RPC 5.9 sets forth specific ethical rules governing  
partnerships between lawyers and LLLTs.75 RPC 5.9(a)(1) specifies that 
lawyers and LLLTs may share fees if they are part of the same firm.76 
Under RPC 5.9(a)(3), LLLTs and lawyers may practice “in the form of a 
professional corporation, association, or other business structure  
authorized to practice law for a profit in which an LLLT owns an interest 
or serves as a corporate director or officer or occupies a position of  
similar responsibility.”77 
RPC 5.9(b) further specifies that lawyers and LLLTs may practice 
in law firms as partners only if certain requirements are met: LLLTs may 
not “direct or regulate any lawyer’s professional judgment,” have  
supervisory authority over lawyers, or “possess a majority ownership 
interest or exercise controlling managerial authority in the firm.”78  
Furthermore, managing lawyers must “expressly undertake  
responsibility” for their LLLT partners’ or owners’ conduct “to the same 
extent they are responsible for the conduct of lawyers in the firm.”79   
                                                     
 73. See Letter from SASMF, LLP, supra note 53, at 2. 
 74. See WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.9. 
 75. See RPC Amendments, supra note 42, at 62–63. 
 76. See id. at 62. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. In general, “a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the non-lawyer shall 
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional  
obligations of the lawyer.” WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3(b). The provision in RPC 5.9 
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RPC 5.9 emphasizes the importance of protecting lawyers’  
professional judgment, but it does not fully address an important issue 
that arises in amending RPC 5.4 and creating RPC 5.9: lawyers and 
LLLTs in the same firm will share fees with one another. The Model 
Rules contain a general prohibition against lawyers sharing fees with 
non-lawyers,80 but they allow lawyers who are not in the same firm to 
share legal fees.81 In Formal Ethics Opinion 464, the ABA considered 
whether lawyers in Model Rules jurisdictions may divide legal fees with 
lawyers or firms that eventually share fees with non-lawyers.82 The ABA 
concluded that this kind of fee sharing does not violate the Model Rules 
“simply because a non-lawyer could ultimately receive some portion of 
the fee under the applicable law of the other jurisdiction.”83 The ABA 
stated that its conclusion was consistent with the policy behind the  
Model Rules because “there is no reason to believe that the  
non-lawyer . . . might actually influence the independent professional 
judgment of the lawyer in the Model Rules jurisdiction, who practices in 
a different firm, in a different jurisdiction.”84 
Formal Ethics Opinion 464 likely makes it permissible for LLLTs 
who are partners in law firms to share in fees generated by lawyers  
practicing in Model Rules jurisdictions. However, it does not address the 
problem that, within law firms with LLLT partners, the lawyers will end 
up subsidizing the LLLTs’ income with fees from work that LLLTs are 
prohibited from doing. For example, LLLTs who own an interest in a law 
firm and are compensated, in part, based on the firm’s annual profits, 
would be earning a portion of every fee earned by the firm’s lawyers. 
Assuming that the lawyers’ services were billed at higher rates than the 
LLLTs’ services and that the lawyers worked on matters that the LLLTs, 
if practicing alone, would be prohibited from handling, the LLLTs’  
benefit from partnering with lawyers would far outweigh the LLLTs’ 
contributions to the firm.85 Assuming that LLLTs might not be able to 
earn the same income if they were solo practitioners or members of firms 
                                                                                                                       
requiring managing lawyers to take responsibility for LLLTs’ conduct is similar to D.C. RPC 5.4 
mentioned above. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(b)(3). 
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 82. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 13-464 (2013). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See generally Jerry Moberg & Greg McLawsen, Is There a Case for Bringing LLLTs Into a 
Firm?, 69 NWLAWYER 20 (Nov. 2015), http://nwlawyer.wsba.org/nwlawyer/ 
november_2015?pg=22#pg22 [https://perma.cc/PE3D-924Q]. 
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made up of only LLLTs,86 fee sharing between lawyers and LLLTs could 
amount to a windfall to LLLT partners, whose income would be the  
result of the lawyers’ training and skills. 
However, it is not clear that law firms will be motivated to hire 
LLLTs and share fees with them because LLLT services may not  
be cheaper than new lawyers’ fees or generate sufficient profits. In a  
recent article, two Washington lawyers consider whether it makes  
business sense to include LLLTs in law firms.87 One of the authors, the 
former chair of the WSBA Solo and Small Practice Section, said, if “it is 
not uncommon for recent graduates to free-lance for $25/hour,” then 
“[w]hy hire a ‘lawyer lite’ when you can just hire a lawyer?”88 The  
article also discusses the fact that law firms generate profits due to the 
difference between the billable rate (paid by the client) and the cost of 
legal labor (the attorney’s compensation),89 which makes sense for  
lawyers but not for LLLTs. Assuming LLLTs could charge cheaper rates 
and be paid less than lawyers, such as an LLLT earning $40 per hour for 
work billed to a client at $80 per hour, “[a] solid 40-hour workweek 
would render $1,600, from which a firm would still have to pay overhead 
associated with the LLLT. The law firm would have to achieve  
extraordinary volume to make this model significantly profitable.”90 
B. The LLLT Rules of Professional Conduct 
In addition to the amendments and additions to the RPCs, there is a 
proposed set of ethical rules for LLLTs called the LLLT RPCs,91 which 
are substantially similar to the RPCs.92 Under the LLLT RPCs, LLLTs 
are held to the same standard of care as lawyers,93 and “[t]he Washington 
law of attorney–client privilege and law of a lawyer’s fiduciary  
responsibility to the client shall apply to the Limited License Legal 
Technician–client relationship to the same extent as it would apply to an 
attorney-client relationship.”94 
                                                     
 86. It is not yet clear how much LLLTs will be able to earn. See generally Blake Edwards, 
Washington State Experiments with Legal Technicians, BLOOMBERG L. (June 29, 2015), 
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 87. See Moberg & McLawsen, supra note 85. 
 88. Moberg & McLawsen, supra note 85, at 22. 
 89. Id. 
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03%20LLLT%20RPC.ashx [https://perma.cc/2PJL-CCQ4]. 
 92. See LTD. LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, cmt. 23. 
 93. See WASH. SUP. CT. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(K)(1). 
 94. See id. R. 28(K)(3). 
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There are several important differences between the RPCs and the 
LLLT RPCs. These differences take the form of additional limitations on 
LLLTs that are not explicitly stated in APR 28. These additional  
limitations are that LLLTs (1) may not advise clients on the possible  
legal consequences of a course of action,95 (2) may not represent  
organizations,96 (3) may not interact with opposing parties,97 (4) may not 
practice outside of Washington,98 and (5) should report violations of the 
LLLT RPCs and the RPCs.99 
1. LLLT RPC 1.2: “Scope of Representation and Allocation  
of Authority between Client and LLLT” 
The value of legal representatives who cannot discuss the possible 
legal consequences of a proposed course of action is questionable;  
therefore, RPC 1.2 allows lawyers to advise clients about the potential 
legal consequences of their actions.100 In contrast, LLLTs are “prohibited 
from discussing with a client the legal consequences of any proposed 
criminal or fraudulent conduct and assisting a client in  
determining the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law with 
respect to any such conduct.”101 This difference is important when  
considered along with LLLTs’ obligation to refer clients to lawyers if the 
LLLT determines that a matter extends beyond the LLLT’s scope of 
practice.102 Presumably, if a client were to ask an LLLT to speculate 
about the legal consequences of a course of action, the LLLT would have 
refuse to answer or make a referral to an attorney to avoid violating both 
APR 28 and the LLLT RPCs. 
2. LLLT RPC 1.13: Organizations as Clients 
In addition to being prohibited from giving legal advice to  
individuals, LLLTs’ scope of practice does not include representing  
organizations.103 Because the current scope of practice for LLLTs is  
confined to family law issues, this limitation does not seem important 
now; however, it could significantly hinder the expansion of LLLTs’ 
                                                     
 95. See LTD. LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2, cmt. 2. 
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scope of practice into other areas of law where the potential clients could 
be corporations or other business entities. APR 28 and the LLLT RPCs,  
taken as a whole, seem to assume that business entities are not among the 
class of individuals who cannot afford legal representation by lawyers 
and would benefit from being able to hire LLLTs. 
3. LLLT RPCs 4.2 and 4.3: “Communication with Person Represented 
by Lawyer” and “Dealing with Person Not Represented by Lawyer” 
LLLTs cannot give legal advice, represent organizations, and,  
according to LLLT RPC 4.2, “there is no circumstance in which an 
LLLT could communicate with a person represented by a lawyer about 
the subject matter of the representation.”104 Under LLLT RPC 4.3, an 
LLLT is strictly prohibited from communicating with another party 
about the subject of the representation,105 and the client of an LLLT is 
considered an unrepresented person.106 In a recent report on the status of 
the LLLT program, the WSBA LLLT Board Scope of Practice  
Committee “decided that APR 28 could only be interpreted as not  
permitting any communication at all by an LLLT with an opposing  
counsel or party.”107 
The implications of these rules could be quite significant. LLLTs 
cannot communicate with opposing parties regardless of whether or not 
those parties are represented by lawyers, but if the opposing parties are 
represented by lawyers, those lawyers could communicate with the 
LLLTs’ clients.108 In this situation, an LLLT’s client would either need 
to hire a lawyer or take the chance of being at a significant disadvantage 
as a layperson negotiating against an attorney. In general, a legal  
representative who cannot communicate with an opposing party is of 
questionable value. 
It seems that this error in drafting APR 28 and the LLLT RPCs has 
become a practical issue for LLLT clients. According to the LLLT  
Report mentioned above, “[t]he current prohibition against LLLTs  
negotiating for their clients has created significant questions” because 
clients might be put in situations where “it would clearly be in their best 
interest to have a neutral third party be the contact person.”109 As a result, 
                                                     
 104. LTD. LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2, cmt. 1. 
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the LLLT Board is now considering if “it would be better to have an 
LLLT negotiate directly with an opposing party’s attorney than it is to 
have a pro se party do so, and also whether it would be much easier for 
the attorney to deal with a legal professional rather than a pro se  
layperson.”110 
4. LLLT RPC 5.5: “Unauthorized Practice of Law” 
LLLT RPC 5.5 prohibits LLLTs from engaging in  
multi-jurisdictional practice.111 Lawyers, under certain circumstances, 
may practice law in jurisdictions where they are not licensed.112  
Conversely, LLLT RPC 5.5 states that “[u]nless and until other  
jurisdictions authorize Washington-licensed LLLTs to practice law, it 
will be unethical under this Rule for the LLLT to provide or attempt to 
provide legal services” outside of Washington State.113 The comments to 
LLLT RPC 5.5 further state that, “because there are no limited license 
programs in other jurisdictions tantamount to Washington’s LLLT 
rules[,] [there is] no need to authorize non-lawyers in other jurisdictions 
to practice law in Washington, either temporarily or on an ongoing  
basis.”114 
The fact that neither the LLLT RPCs nor other states’ RPCs  
contemplate multi-jurisdictional practice could be evidence that LLLTs 
are not in demand. If there was a national market for LLLTs, then there 
would be pressure on other state bar associations or courts to adopt 
LLLT rules and to allow multi-jurisdictional practice by LLLTs.  
Moreover, if the Washington State Supreme Court was confident that 
non-lawyer legal practitioners would be appearing in legal markets 
across the nation115 with increased frequency and volume, or that  
non-lawyer practitioners are desperately needed to close the access to 
justice gap, then the LLLT RPCs would have been written to allow  
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non-lawyer practitioners from other states to practice in Washington in 
some capacity. 
5. LLLT RPC 8.3: “Reporting Professional Misconduct” 
In addition to the prohibitions against LLLTs giving legal advice, 
representing organizations, communicating with opposing parties, and 
practicing outside of Washington, the LLLT RPCs suggest that LLLTs 
should report ethical violations by other LLLTs and lawyers.116 The 
LLLT RPCs provide that an LLLT “should” inform the appropriate  
authorities when the LLLT knows that another lawyer or LLLT has  
violated ethical rules in a manner “that raises a substantial question as to 
that LLLT’s or that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as an 
LLLT or lawyer in other respects.”117 Likewise, RPC 8.3 provides that a 
lawyer “should” inform the appropriate authorities when the lawyer 
knows that another lawyer or an LLLT has violated ethical rules.118 
These rules seem to assume that LLLTs will know and understand 
the extent of the RPCs and that lawyers will know the extent of LLLTs’ 
ethical responsibilities. Because lawyers could potentially be subject to 
discipline for LLLTs’ conduct regardless of whether the LLLTs are  
employees or partners in the firm,119 it is reasonable to expect that a  
lawyer should inform the appropriate authorities if an LLLT violates  
ethical rules. However, recommending that LLLTs should report lawyers 
to disciplinary authorities is potentially problematic because LLLTs have 
substantially less education than lawyers120 and, presumably, very little 
understanding of the RPCs. 
For LLLTs employed in law firms and supervised by lawyers, 
LLLT RPC 8.3 suggests that the LLLTs should be monitoring their  
bosses’ conduct for RPC violations. It seems unlikely that LLLTs will 
have enough knowledge of the RPCs to spot ethical issues or have the 
motivation to become whistle-blowers. Although this could also be the 
case for new lawyers supervised by senior lawyers, LLLTs  
reporting lawyers for ethical violations still seems less likely because of 
LLLTs’ limited opportunities and scope of practice. For lawyers working 
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in firms who believe that the other lawyers consistently violate the RPCs, 
the possible solutions are to change firms or start a new firm. In the case 
of LLLTs who believe the lawyers in the firm are practicing unethically, 
changing firms may or may not be possible because not all firms will 
employ LLLTs. Similarly, starting a new firm may not be financially 
possible due to the limits on LLLTs’ scope of practice and their inability 
to change practice areas. Under these circumstances, LLLTs who believe 
lawyers are violating ethical rules may have an incentive to look the  
other way instead of jeopardizing their already limited career  
opportunities by reporting their supervisors to the WSBA.    
Moreover, because of LLLTs’ extremely limited scope of practice, 
there seems to be a greater possibility that LLLTs will violate ethical 
rules. LLLTs are restricted to practicing in a single area of law, under 
very limited circumstances; thus, they will have a very small number of 
potential clients who need the precise kind of services they can  
provide. Due to the market for clients being so small, LLLTs may be  
motivated to accept as many clients as possible. This motivation could 
lead to scope of practice violations by LLLTs seeking to retain clients 
whose legal problems appear to be simple at first, but turn out to be  
beyond what the LLLTs are allowed to handle under APR 28 or the 
LLLT RPCs: “If the legal technician does not realize that an issue  
exists, he or she won’t recognize the need to refer a client to an attorney. 
The potential for abuse is high when a legal technician has a financial 
incentive to keep the client in the dark.”121  
Consequently, LLLTs will not be motivated to report other LLLTs 
or lawyers for ethical violations, and the recommendation that LLLTs 
should report ethical violations, therefore, provides little or no protection 
for clients. 
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST LLLTS 
The foregoing discussion reveals that APR 28, the RPC revisions, 
and the LLLT RPCs allow non-lawyers access to the legal profession, 
but clients may only get access to representation that is so limited it is 
inadequate. In addition, because the Washington State Supreme Court 
allocated the expenses of implementing the LLLT program to the 
WSBA, lawyers’ bar membership dues have been used to subsidize the 
creation of a practitioner that will likely compete with lawyers.122  
Accordingly, the dissent to APR 28, authored by Justice Owens, points 
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outs that the rule was “ill-considered, incorrect, and most of all  
extremely unfair to members of the Washington State Bar  
Association.”123 
Justice Owens expressed concern about the fact that “there [was] 
uncertainty about whether the [LLLT] certification fees [would] produce  
sufficient funds to underwrite the annual cost of the legal technician  
program,” which led to the requirement that the WSBA provide  
additional funding for the LLLT program.124 Justice Owens further  
argued that it was unfair to place this monetary burden on the WSBA 
because the WSBA had already invested in a number of programs to  
address the problems APR 28 was designed to solve;125 instead, she  
suggested that the Washington State Supreme Court should have taken 
responsibility for APR 28.126 
However, Justice Owens speculated “that[,] if this court had been 
asked to assume financial responsibility for establishing and  
administering this major program for certification of legal technicians, 
with the vague promise that the program may someday be  
self-supporting,” the court would have decided that there was not enough 
money in the budget.127 Justice Owens concluded that it was not “fair or 
equitable for th[e] court to eschew assuming financial responsibility for 
this program in this time of economic distress, and instead impose the 
obligation on all of the state’s lawyers, many of whom are feeling the 
adverse effects of the current downturn of the economy.”128 
Notwithstanding Justice Owens’ dissent to APR 28, there are  
several arguments against the existence of LLLTs: (A) LLLTs will not 
close the access to justice gap because they will not necessarily be  
willing or able to charge lower rates than attorneys, (B) LLLTs will take 
work away from small and solo firms, (C) LLLTs will provide  
inadequate legal services, (D) LLLTs should not be permitted to practice 
in family law because of the complexity of the issues involved, and (E) 
LLLTs will engage in the unauthorized practice of law. These arguments 
are discussed in turn below. 
A. LLLTs Will Not Close the Access to Justice Gap 
LLLTs will not close the access to justice gap by serving  
economically disadvantaged clients. Before the adoption of APR 28, two 
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members of the WSBA Board of Governors argued that, because of their 
limited scope of practice, LLLTs would not be able to earn enough  
money; therefore, very few people would have the incentive to become 
LLLTs and there would be no net effect on the access to justice gap:129 
[T]he POLB envisions that a significant number of  
college-educated, law office-trained professionals will leave their 
jobs and . . . work at low rates in a single area of law with  
significant restrictions upon the scope of their practice, for people of 
modest means. . . . This vision is neither realistic nor economically 
viable.130 
Even if there were enough LLLTs to serve the large number of  
low-income, unrepresented persons, “[a]ll we’re providing is access to 
injustice, because [LLLTs] will not have the competency to actually do 
for the poor what needs to be done”; “[j]ust because you’re poor doesn’t 
mean your legal problems are simple.”131 The reality is that “legal  
technicians simply disguise a much larger problem—that poor citizens 
need help getting access to fully trained lawyers.”132 
Moreover, APR 28 was designed to create a practitioner that could 
help some of the “thousands of unrepresented (pro se) individuals” that 
appear in Washington courts, but do we really “know that otherwise  
self-represented litigants would pay for the services of a  
limited license legal technician when they were not willing to pay for the 
services of an attorney?”133 
Ultimately, the LLLT program will fail to close the access to  
justice gap because “[t]here are no protections . . . to ensure that legal 
technicians will actually provide services to the poor, as opposed to  
selling their services to those who can most afford them”;134 “the cost of 
hiring a legal technician w[ill] likely be no less expensive than hiring a 
young or less experienced attorney.”135 “[T]here is no guarantee that 
LLLTs will charge affordable rates. They can charge whatever they 
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want.”136 Even a recently licensed LLLT who intends to start her own 
practice admitted that “[i]t may not be possible to offer services to the 
lowest income residents, . . . [w]e may have to target median income 
people.”137 Indeed, there is nothing in APR 28 mandating that LLLTs 
serve clients of a certain income level or that LLLTs are required to 
charge any particular amount for their services. 
Finally, LLLTs will not be able to close the access to justice gap by 
providing legal services at substantially lower costs than attorneys  
because, “unlike full service lawyers, legal techs won’t have the ability 
to subsidize low end, unbundled work with higher cost services—which 
is what many lawyers do to make low bono work viable.”138  
B. LLLTs Will Take Business Away From Small & Solo Firms 
Even if LLLTs end up serving some low-income clients, LLLTs 
will take business away from small firms and solo practitioners. Part of 
the rationale for the LLLT rule is that consumers with simple problems 
will hire LLLTs rather than lawyers because not everyone needs a lawyer 
to solve their legal problems. If this rationale actually leads to LLLTs 
gaining business from clients with simple legal issues, small firms and 
solo practitioners will lose more business than any other legal  
service provider—“[i]ntroduction of a new class of limited licensed  
professionals will continue to erode the economic model of solo and 
small law firm practice by sucking out from those practices the more  
routine legal services which are important to sustaining the economic 
viability of those law firms.”139 
Furthermore, “[w]ith unemployment rampant in today’s legal  
market . . . hanging a shingle [starting a solo or small firm] is a lifeline 
for lawyers who want a career in the law.”140 The less complex cases, 
such as uncontested divorces, which LLLTs can now handle, “give  
inexperienced new lawyers a chance to cut their chops and work their 
way up to more difficult and high-paying cases.”141 Unfortunately, 
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“higher initial cost and overhead will ensure that traditional lawyers will 
be unable to fairly compete with [LLLTs] for this oft-needed work. Cut 
off from their bread-and-butter business, the number of small firms and 
solo practitioners would be greatly reduced.”142 
If there is a reduction in the number of solo practitioners, then the 
overall cost of retaining an attorney will increase for those who have 
more complicated problems and need to hire attorneys rather than 
LLLTs. Therefore, LLLTs may actually widen the access to justice gap 
because fewer and fewer people will be able to afford to retain an  
attorney. 
C. LLLTs Will Provide Inadequate Legal Services 
No matter what kind of clients LLLTs serve, it is not likely  
that LLLTs will provide quality legal services because they have  
substantially less training than lawyers. As one family law lawyer put it, 
“I am by no means knocking the two-year education, but I don’t think 
someone with an associate’s degree can do what a lawyer can do.”143 
LLLTs’ services will be inadequate because, “[i]f  
litigation becomes necessary, the legal technician will not be able to  
appear or participate in court or in depositions and the client will have to 
hire a licensed attorney, potentially duplicating costs they have already 
incurred.”144 “LLLTs ‘can only go so far with you. And then what? You 
still have to bring in a lawyer to litigate the case,’ . . . [Lawyers are]  
going to come in in the fourth quarter, in the last 10 minutes of the 
game?’ That’s ineffective legal practice that won’t serve consumers 
well.”145 
There is also evidence that consumers prefer having attorneys help 
with their legal problems. “Among those with legal problems who seek 
but do not get an attorney’s help, only 19 percent were satisfied with the 
way their legal problems work out. When households receive an  
attorney’s help, however, the satisfaction rate more than triples, to 
61%.”146 
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In many cases, LLLTs may end up providing substandard legal  
services simply because they may not fully understand their clients’ legal  
problems: “[W]hat seems like a simple legal issue (surely one that ‘legal 
technicians’ will be allowed to handle) can branch out into many  
complex issues.”147 
D. LLLTs Should Not Practice in Family Law 
Some family law practitioners argue that, regardless of the merit of 
the LLLT program generally, LLLTs should not be allowed to practice in 
family law because of its complexity.148 According to the former chair of 
the WSBA Family Law Section, Jean Cotton: 
Family law is one of the most challenging areas of legal practice, 
balancing the skill of litigation with knowledge of the law, the  
psychology of clients going through one of the most stressful events 
of their lives. . . . Providing inaccurate or inadequate legal services 
in family law cases can lead to long-term, disastrous results for the 
families of our state. Examples of potential problematic outcomes 
include: 
 Loss of custody or contact with one’s children.  
 Erroneous child-support obligation calculations.  
 Inequitable or inaccurate allocation of property and liabilities in 
dissolutions.  
 Misidentification of fathers.  
 Waiver of parentage challenges.  
 Lack or inappropriate issuance of restraining or protective  
orders. 
The emotional and financial cost to clients to correct most of these 
types of errors would far exceed the cost of doing them right the 
first time with the assistance of an experienced attorney.149 
Cotton also pointed out that “[f]amily law is notoriously productive 
of malpractice claims and complaints to the bar association; it is not the 
area one would pick to permit lay persons to begin practicing law.”150 
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Cotton further argued that LLLTs are not necessary because Washington 
already has a Courthouse Facilitator Program151 to aid pro se litigants in 
family law152 and because family law “attorneys already are providing 
services either at reduced rates or on a pro bono basis for their family law 
clients much more often than for any other type of clientele.”153 
Another argument against LLLTs practicing in family law is that 
LLLTs’ scope of practice is too limited to serve family law clients  
effectively. As the Washington Young Lawyers Division of the WSBA 
pointed out, LLLTs are prohibited from addressing “almost every known 
issue there is in family law, i.e., real property transfers, retirement  
benefits, [and] interstate disputes.”154 Similarly, regarding the limitation 
that LLLTs cannot enter into negotiations on behalf of their clients, an 
Illinois family law lawyer said, “[t]hat’s what family lawyers do all 
day. . . . So I’m not sure what [an LLLT] is going to do.”155 
E. LLLTs Will Increase the Incidence of the  
Unauthorized Practice of Law 
The final argument against LLLTs is that the ambiguous definition 
of “the practice of law,”156 when combined with the provisions of APR 
28, creates an environment in which LLLTs are particularly susceptible 
to engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. 
1. The Practice of Law 
To define “the unauthorized practice of law,” one must first define 
the phrase “the practice of law.” Washington State Supreme Court  
General Rule 24 states that “[t]he practice of law is the application of 
legal principles and judgment with regard to the circumstances or  
objectives of another entity or person(s) which require the knowledge 
and skill of a person trained in the law.”157 
According to the Washington State Supreme Court, “[t]he practice 
of law does not lend itself easily to precise definition,”158 and “[t]he line 
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between those activities included within the definition of the practice of 
law and those that are not is oftentimes difficult to determine.”159 “[T]he 
nature and character of the service performed . . . governs whether given 
activities constitute the practice of law.”160 The court has defined the 
“practice of law” to include “legal advice and counsel”161 and “the  
selection and completion of form legal documents, or the drafting of such 
documents, including deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust, promissory notes 
and agreements modifying these documents.”162 
Conversely, the court has also held that real estate brokers or  
salespeople are “permitted to complete simple printed standardized real 
estate forms, which [] must be approved by a lawyer.”163 This rule  
applies only “for simple real estate transactions which arise in the usual 
course of the broker’s business” and “only in connection with real estate 
transactions actually handled by such broker or salesperson as a broker 
or salesperson . . . without charge.”164 If brokers “prepare[] a contract at 
variance with the client’s instructions, [they are] liable for  
negligence.”165 
2. What is the Unauthorized Practice of Law? 
With the ambiguous definition of “the practice of law” in mind, one 
can now try to understand what “the unauthorized practice of law” 
means. This phrase is defined by statute,166 but four of the five  
enumerated acts that would constitute the unauthorized practice of law 
are now allowed by APR 28 because LLLTs can share ownership in law 
firms and share fees with lawyers.167 The only remaining definition of the  
unauthorized practice of law is when “[a] non-lawyer practices law, or 
holds himself or herself out as entitled to practice law.”168 
Adding to the confusion, the statute also provides that “it is a  
defense if proven by the defendant . . . that, at the time of the offense, the 
conduct alleged was authorized by the rules of professional conduct or 
the admission to practice rules.”169 This provision likely means that if an 
LLLT is accused of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, but can 
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prove that the actions taken were authorized by APR 28 or the LLLT 
RPCs, then no liability will result. The phrase “unauthorized practice of 
law” does not appear in APR 28; thus, it is unclear exactly what  
actions by an LLLT would be considered the unauthorized practice of 
law. 
3. LLLTs Are Particularly Susceptible to Engaging  
in the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Although there is currently no definitive answer as to whether a  
violation of APR 28 would be considered the unauthorized practice of 
law, some lawyers think “Washington’s LLLT program legitimizes acts, 
by individuals who are not lawyers that would conventionally constitute 
the unauthorized practice of law.”170 The risk that LLLTs will engage in 
the unauthorized practice of law increases for LLLTs who become  
partners in law firms; there may be “little to protect clients from  
non-lawyers who, while not actually claiming to be lawyers, convey the 
impression of legal literacy because of their partnership  
[status].”171 
In addition, “[a] non-lawyer partner who has had legal training 
probably runs the greatest risk of engaging in the unauthorized practice 
of law.”172 “With the public unable to distinguish a traditional attorney 
from the newly created non-JD limited legal technician, there [will] be 
ample opportunit[ies] for these newly minted professionals to take  
advantage of the public by offering services they are not authorized to 
perform.”173 
Unfortunately, there are few prosecutions for the unauthorized  
practice of law, which means that the incentive to become an LLLT is 
also decreased. “Due to the lack of enforcement, it is . . . a cause for  
concern as to why any individual would go through the rigorous  
certification process when they can already practice law without real 
threat of prosecution.”174 In other words, how do we “know that 
those . . . who are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law would 
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take time and spend the money to obtain such a license, rather than  
continuing to fly under the radar?”175 
IV. The Alternative to LLLTs 
The objections to the creation of LLLTs are not based on a  
disagreement that access to justice is a problem in Washington—the  
disagreement is about the method used to solve the problem. As an  
alternative to allowing non-lawyers access to the legal profession,  
Washington could increase access to justice by expanding the role of the 
Limited Practice Officer (LPO), as other states with similar positions 
have done.176 
A. The Washington LPO 
Although Washington is the first state to create LLLTs, LLLTs are 
not the only non-lawyers that participate in the legal process in the state. 
Admission to Practice Rule 12 (APR 12) created the LPO with the stated 
purpose “to authorize certain lay persons to select, prepare and complete 
legal documents incident to the closing of real estate and personal  
property transactions.”177 
LPOs may only render services only if all the clients involved in the 
transaction agree to the basic terms of the deal and the LPO makes  
certain required disclosures.178 LPOs “may select, prepare and complete 
documents in a form previously approved by the [Limited Practice] 
Board for use by others in, or in anticipation of, closing a loan, extension 
of credit, sale or other transfer of interest in real or personal property.”179 
The documents an LPO may prepare are strictly limited to a preapproved 
list.180 The Washington Court of Appeals has found that LPOs engage in 
the unauthorized practice of law when they use unapproved forms or 
make alterations to approved forms.181 
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LPOs will generally be held to the same standard of care as  
lawyers, but do not have the same duties to clients as lawyers would.182 
The duties not required of an LPO using approved forms include the  
following: 
[T]he duty to investigate legal matters, to form legal opinions  
(including but not limited to the capacity of an individual to sign for 
an entity or whether a legal document is effective), to give legal  
advice (including advice on how a legal document affects the rights 
or duties of a party), or to consult with a party on the advisability of 
a transaction.183 
In order to become an LPO, a person must be at least eighteen years 
old, of good moral character, pass an examination, and execute on 
oath.184 There are also Limited Practice Officer Rules of Professional 
Conduct (LPO RPCs), which are patterned after the RPCs.185 
The LPO RPCs generally reflect LPOs’ limited scope of practice, 
and they create some important rules making LPOs distinct from both 
lawyers and LLLTs. For example, not all LPOs will be competent to 
provide services for every type of transaction,186 and LPOs must refer 
clients to lawyers when they “reasonably believe” clients do not  
understand the “meaning or effect of an instrument.”187 LPOs do not 
have a duty to keep information confidential,188 but they do have a duty 
to disclose “material facts to clients or any parties to the transaction.”189 
The foregoing discussion illustrates that LPOs are similar to LLLTs 
because both positions are governed by the Washington State Supreme 
Court;190 are limited to practicing in one area of law; are limited to  
dealing with the preparation of documents in the context of uncontested 
transactions; and are required to refer clients to lawyers when the  
representation goes beyond the practitioners’ scope of practice. Given the 
number of similarities between LPOs and LLLTs, and the fact that other 
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states have positions similar to the LPO, it is not clear why Washington 
decided to create LLLTs rather than expand the role of LPOs. 
B. Other States Have Positions Similar to the LPO 
In other states that have non-lawyer practitioners, those  
practitioners are “essentially document preparers who,” like Washington 
LPOs, “may not give advice.”191 “In some states the document preparer 
cannot even advise which form to use. In most states, they cannot file the 
documents that they prepare.”192 For example, Arizona and California 
have positions similar to the LPO. In Arizona, the position is called  
“legal document preparer.”193 California has positions called  
“immigration consultants,”194 “unlawful detainer assistants,”195 and  
“legal document assistants.”196 
The fact that other states have created positions similar to the LPO, 
not the LLLT, is evidence that the LPO position serves a need in the  
legal market.197 Conversely, the fact that no other jurisdiction has 
LLLTs—not even D.C., which has the most liberal rules regarding  
lawyer partnerships with non-lawyers—is evidence that there is no  
market or demand for LLLTs.  
C. Advantages of Expanding the Role of LPOs 
Given that LLLTs are only permitted to help clients complete  
documents within one area of law, LLLTs are effectively the same kind 
of practitioner as LPOs. Because the role of LPOs could be expanded to 
include other practice areas, including family law, there is no reason to 
have more than one type of non-lawyer practitioner in Washington. Thus, 
the LLLT is an unnecessary and redundant position. 
There are three main advantages to expanding the role of LPOs  
rather than allowing the LLLT program to continue. First, because LPOs 
are limited to preparing preapproved documents, it is easier to determine 
when LPOs engage in the unauthorized practice of law. The Washington 
State Supreme Court could create a rule that using any form not on the 
preapproved list, or modifying any preapproved form, constitutes the 
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unauthorized practice of law.198 This rule would allow for LPOs to  
practice in other areas of law because the Limited Practice Board would 
merely need to select and approve forms for each new area of law.199  
Furthermore, there is established authority defining the proper role 
of LPOs,200 including the Rules for Enforcement of Limited Practice  
Officer Conduct,201 which means that lawyers and courts would not have 
to expend their time and energy trying to determine what the scope of 
practice and duties of LPOs should be. 
Second, because LPOs do not have the option to form partnerships 
with lawyers, their role is easier for clients to understand. A client  
working with an LPO is not likely to mistake the LPO for a legal  
advocate or advisor because the LPO would only be allowed to help 
complete documents. In contrast, LLLTs who are partners in a firm with 
lawyers or other LLLTs are likely to—intentionally or negligently—
mislead clients into believing that they can advise clients about their 
rights. 
Finally, the use of LPOs could allow lawyers, particularly in solo or 
small firms, to take on more cases, work on more complex matters, or do 
more low bono202 work.  
CONCLUSION 
The Washington State Supreme Court erred in adopting APR 28203 
and amending the RPCs because the existence of an access to justice gap 
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is an insufficient justification for allowing non-lawyers to partner and 
share fees with lawyers. There is no dispute about the fact that there are 
people in Washington who are not receiving the legal help they need. 
However, LLLTs are not the proper solution to this problem because this 
underserved population needs fully trained lawyers, not non-lawyers who 
can practice law only under very limited circumstances. Indeed, this is 
likely the reason that the other fifty jurisdictions in the United States 
have not adopted rules similar to APR 28. 
Alternatively, expanding the role of the Washington LPO would 
likely allow for the provision of quality legal services without increasing 
the incidences of the unauthorized practice of law or misleading clients. 
It would also allow lawyers more time to do low bono work, which 
would help close the access to justice gap. 
